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Abstract 
 
 
Using the popular FOX TV reality show, American Idol, this paper makes a contribution 
to the literatures on the design of contests, the allocation of voting rights in committees, 
and the desirability of low-powered incentive schemes. In American Idol, the judges, who 
are presumably experts in evaluating singing effort, have no voting power when the field 
is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants. It is only the votes of viewers that count. 
In the 2007 season of the show, one of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to quit the 
show if a contestant, Sanjaya Malakar, who was clearly a low-ability contestant, won the 
competition. He was concerned that the show was becoming a popularity contest instead 
of a singing contest. Is this a problem? Not necessarily. I show that, under certain 
conditions, making success in the contest dependent on a contestant’s popularity and not 
solely on her singing ability or performance, could paradoxically increase aggregate 
singing effort. It may be optimal to give the entire voting power to the viewers whose 
evaluation of singing effort is noisier.  
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1. Introduction 
 
American Idol and Dancing with the stars are two very successful reality shows1 
on the American TV networks, Fox and ABC, respectively.2 American Idol is particularly 
successful. With the exception of the Super Bowl and the Academy Awards, American 
Idol is the highest rated viewed 3program on U.S. national television and is broadcast in 
over 100 countries outside of the USA. 
American Idol is a singing contest and Dancing with the Stars is a dancing 
contest. A unique feature of these two TV shows is that the votes of viewers count in 
determining the winner of the show. For example, in Dancing with the stars, the votes of 
both the viewers and the judges (i.e., the experts) count. In American Idol, only the votes 
of the judges count in the preliminary rounds and only the votes of viewers count in 
advanced rounds (i.e., when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants). 
Since the judges and viewers may have different preferences, these can sometimes lead to 
problems. Indeed, in the 2007 season of American idol, there was a low-ability 
contestant, Sanjaya Malakar, who the judges did not like but kept advancing through the 
rounds because the viewers liked him. One of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to 
                                                 
1American Idol, which debuted in 2002, is an offshoot of Pop Idol, a British television (singing) reality 
show which debuted on the ITV network in 2001. As noted at wikipedia.com, the Idol series has become an 
international franchise; it has spun off many successful shows such as Australian Idol, Latin American Idol, 
Idols (Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, South Africa), Canadian Idol, Idols West Africa, Indian Idol, 
Indonesian Idol, New Zealand Idol, Hay Superstar, Nouvelle Star , Pinoy Idol (Philippines), Deutschland 
sucht den Superstar, Singapore Idol, Malaysian Idol, Vietnam Idol, Music Idol, Ídolos Brazil, Ídolos 
Portugal, and Super Star. 
2Some of the top twelve finalists on American Idol have gone on to chalk successes: six of them of have 
been nominated for the 2008 Grammy awards. One of them, Carrie Underwood has already won two 
Grammys and Jennifer Hudson, through the exposure that the show gave her, had the opportunity to star in 
the movie Dreamgirls which won her an Oscar in 2007. The websites for both shows can be found at: 
http://www.americanidol.com/ and http://abc.go.com/primetime/dancingwiththestars/index?pn=index 
3 Note that the Super Bowl and Academy Awards take place only once in a year. In each season, American 
Idol is shown twice a week over a 4-month period. In this sense, it is the number one rated show in 
America. 
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quit the show if Sanjaya won the competition.  
 To be sure, American Idol is a singing contest, but it sometimes runs the risk of 
becoming a popularity contest. A contestant could be popular on the show based on 
his/her singing ability or performance. However, by popularity, I mean components of a 
contestant's success that are based on his non-singing performance or ability (i.e., 
popularity based on reasons other than a contestant’s ability to sing). This is consistent 
with Simon Cowell’s frustration in the Sanjaya Malakar episode. 
One way of dealing with this apparent popularity problem is to allocate the entire 
voting power to the judges. However, that might lead to a huge fall in TV ratings and 
revenue. A reason why the votes of viewers is allowed to determine the winner(s) is 
because it gives the viewers a sense of participation and increases the numbers of viewers 
leading to an increase in TV ratings and revenue. Allowing the votes of viewers to count 
increases the excitement of the show. There may well be a trade-off between this 
participation effect and the possible disincentive effect on singing effort of allowing any 
Tom, Dick, and Harry who has a phone to vote.  
In American Idol, as mentioned above, only the votes of judges count in 
preliminary rounds. This allows the judges to narrow the set of possible contestants in 
order to possibly minimize any subsequent errors in selection that might emerge when 
viewers’ votes later determine the winner(s) in subsequent rounds. However, as the 
Sanjaya case demonstrated, this cannot eliminate this risk. Alternatively, in Dancing with 
the stars this problem may have been addressed by assigning non-zero weights to the 
votes of the judges and viewers. But how should these weights be determined? What 
factors should be taken into account? Could the American Idol allocation of voting power 
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be optimal? In this paper, I show, among others, that differences in the abilities of the 
contestants should be an important consideration. 
While the goal of American Idol is to discover talent who will hopefully become 
future stars in the music industry, I assume that the organizers want to simultaneously 
boost current aggregate singing effort in the show. Boosting aggregate effort in the 
competition is good for the show’s TV rating and increases revenue. 
 I show that, under certain conditions, making success in the contest dependent on 
a contestant’s popularity and not solely on her singing ability or performance, could 
paradoxically increase aggregate singing effort. By allowing the votes of viewers to 
count, sufficient noise is introduced into the contest since the viewers tend to care more, 
relative to the judges, about factors other than a contestant’s singing ability or 
performance. This low-powered incentive can paradoxically lead to an increase in 
aggregate efforts because it levels the playing field between high-ability contestants and 
low-ability contestants inducing the low-ability contestants to exert more effort which, in 
turn, puts pressure on the high-ability to work harder.  
This paper goes beyond American Idol. It makes the following more general 
contributions: First, it shows that increasing the degree of noise or luck in a contest could 
lead to an increase in aggregate efforts, if there are substantial differences among the 
contestants. I am not aware of this result in literature on contests. Second, it contributes to 
an understanding of the allocation of voting weights in contests administered by a 
committee. Third, it contributes to the recent economics literature which shows that low-
powered incentives may enhance efficiency (see, for example, Francois and Vlassopoulos 
(2007) for a survey). 
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I demonstrate the main result of the paper in the next section and relate it to other 
results in the literature on contests and incentives. Section 3 concludes the paper. 
 
2. An American-Idol type contest: a model 
 
While American Idol and Dancing with the Stars are dynamic contests, I illustrate 
the key idea of this paper by analyzing a static contest. This makes sense if the 
contestants focus on a round at a time. Indeed, most of the contestants in American Idol 
when asked about their thoughts and preparation for future rounds invariably respond that 
they are only focusing on the current round.  
Consider a singing contest, such as American Idol, Canadian Idol, or Pop Idol 
with two risk-neutral contestants. Suppose a singing effort (performance) of xk by 
contestant k translates into qk = xk + ηk votes by the judges and yk = xk + εk votes by  
viewers, k = 1,2.4 Assume that εk and ηk  are independently distributed random variables.5 
Also, Cov(ε1, ε2) = Cov(η1, η2) = 0.  
I assume that εk  and ηk are each normally distributed with mean zero and 
variances, 2εσ  and 2ησ  respectively. In what follows, I assume that 2εσ  > 2ησ  > 0. This 
assumption is motivated by the following two reasons: (i) the judges may care more 
about effort in the contest than the viewers. The viewers may care more about a 
                                                 
4 My treatment of the judges’ votes is analogous to the voting rule in Dancing with the Stars and figure 
skating competitions. Each judge in these contests scores a contestant’s performance out of 10 and a 
contestants’ overall score is the sum of the judges’ scores. Amegashie (2006) studies the incentive effects 
of voting by judges in international figure skating within the context of the figure skating scandal at the 
2002 winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, USA. 
5 To the extent that the judges’ votes and/or comments are observed by the viewers in both American Idol 
and Dancing with the Stars before the viewers cast their votes, one may argue that the judges’ votes could 
affect components of the viewers’ vote function. For simplicity and to allow me focus on the main 
argument of the paper, I do not consider this possible effect.  
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contestant’s popularity or personality relative to the judges, and (ii) the judges, being 
experts, can evaluate singing effort better than the viewers. 
Let V > 0 be the prize of winning the contest. Let Ck(xk) = θkC(xk) be the cost of 
effort to contestant k, where  θk is a positive parameter and C(xk) is increasing and strictly 
convex. If θ1 < θ2, then contestant 1 has a higher ability than contestant 2 since his cost of 
exerting effort is lower. 
Let α be the weight given to the votes of viewers, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then 
contestant k will win the contest, if αyk + (1-α)qk ≥  αyj + (1-α)qj, k = 1, 2, j =1,2, and k ≠ 
j. Then contestant 1’s payoff is 
Π1= Pr(αy1 + (1-α)q1 ≥ αy2 + (1-α)q2)V – θ1C(x1)  = Pr(m ≤ x1 – x2) – θ1C(x1), 
where m ≡ α(ε2 – ε1) + (1– α)(η2 – η1). Since εk and ηk are normally distributed with mean 
zero and variances 2εσ  and 2ησ , it follows that m is normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance σ2 = α2( 2εσ + 2εσ ) + (1-α)2( 2ησ + 2ησ ). Let g be the density function of m and 
G be its distribution function. 
We can write contestant 1’s payoff as  
Π1= G(x1 – x2)V – θ1C(x1).        (1) 
Similarly, contestant 2’s payoff is 
Π2 = G(x2 – x1)V – θ2C(x2).        (2) 
First-order conditions for an interior solution require that 0)x(CV)xx(g 1121 =′θ−−  and 
0)x(CV)xx(g 2212 =′θ−− . This can be rewritten as 
,0)x(CV
2
)xx(exp
2
1
x 112
2
21
1
1 =′θ−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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σ
−−πσ=∂
Π∂      (3) 
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and 
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From (3) and (4), it follows that, in equilibrium, )x(C)x(C *22
*
11 ′θ=′θ . Then the 
strict convexity of C(xk) implies that *2
*
1 xx > , if θ1 < θ2. Therefore, in equilibrium, the 
contestant with the higher ability exerts a greater effort. Without any loss of generality, I 
assume that θ2 ≥ θ1. Hence, contestant 1 is has a higher ability than contestant 2. 
As in tournament models, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria is not 
guaranteed. Pure-strategy equilibria exist if the variance of the error terms is sufficiently 
high.6 To elaborate on this, note that second-order conditions require 
0)x(CV)xx(g 1121 <′′θ−−′  and .0)x(CV)xx(g 2212 <′′θ−−′ This condition holds for 
the high-ability contestant since 0)xx(g 21 <−′ given *2*1 xx > and C(x1) is strictly 
convex. However, it may not hold for the low-ability contestant. We can rewrite the low-
ability contestant’s second-order condition as 
0)x(CV
2
)xx(exp
2
)xx( *
222
2*
1
*
2
3
*
1
*
2 <′′θ−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
σ
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−−      (5) 
The first-term on the left hand side is positive since *2
*
1 xx > . It attains a maximum value 
at σ−=− *1*2 xx . Therefore, a sufficient but not necessary condition for (5) to hold is  
0)]x(Cmin[
2
1exp
2
V *
222 <′′θ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−πσ .      (6) 
                                                 
6 See Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). As noted by Lazear and Rosen (1981, fn. 
2), “Contests are feasible only if chance is a significant factor.” In the extreme case where the variance of 
the error terms is zero, the contest becomes a variant of a non-stochastic all-pay auction which is known to 
have no equilibrium in pure strategies (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996). 
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To simplify the analysis, I assume that C(xk) = exp(xk), k = 1,2.7 Then since x2 ≥ 0 
and )xexp()x(C 22 =′′  is monotonically increasing in x2, it follows that  
)]x(Cmin[ *2′′  = exp( 0 ) = 1. Hence we can rewrite (6) as 
0
2
1exp
2
V
22 <θ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−πσ         (6a) 
Then there exists an interior solution if σ2 is sufficiently high such that (6a) holds.8  
Given that )x(C)x(C *22
*
11 ′θ=′θ holds in equilibrium, it follows that  
)xexp()xexp( *22
*
11 θ=θ . So *2*1 x)bln(x += , where b ≡ θ2/θ1 ≥ 1. Putting 
*
2
*
1 x)bln(x += into (3) gives 
,0)xexp(V
2
))b(ln(exp
2
1
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*
112
2
1
1 =θ−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
σ−πσ=∂
Π∂      (7) 
Aggregate effort *1x  + 
*
2x  = 
*
1x2 – ln(b) > 0. Hence, I investigate the effect of the 
voting weight of the viewers on aggregate effort by differentiating equation (7) with 
respect to α noting that *1x  and σ
2 = 2α2 2εσ  + 2(1– α)2 2ησ  are functions of α. This gives 
α∂
σ∂
πθσ
−σλ=α∂
∂
2)xexp(
]1)/)b[(ln(Vx
*
11
2
2*
1 ,       (8) 
where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
σ−≡λ 2
2
2
))b(ln(exp . 
                                                 
7 It is not unusual to obtain results in tournament models by assuming specific functional forms for cost, 
utility, or density functions. See, for example, part of the discussion in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). 
8 Given that (6a) holds, the objective functions of both contestants are strictly concave for all effort levels 
and hence the equilibrium effort levels are unique. 
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Now 0>α∂
σ∂ if  α 2εσ  > (1-α) 2ησ . This holds if 2εσ  is sufficiently bigger than 2ησ . 
In other words, relative to the judges, the viewers’ voting behavior is influenced 
sufficiently more by factors other than the singing effort of the contestants. As argued 
previously, I interpret this as meaning that the viewers are influenced more by the 
popularity of contestants than the judges are. 
When the contestants are identical (i.e., θ1 = θ2), then b = 1 and *1x =
*
2x = x*. So 
ln(b) = 0. Hence α∂∂ /*x  < 0 if α∂σ∂ / > 0. Therefore, if the contestants are identical 
increasing the noise in the contest will unambiguously decrease aggregate efforts. 
 If the contestants are non-identical, then b > 1. It follows that if α∂σ∂ / > 0 and 
(ln(b)/σ)2 – 1 > 0, the derivative in (8) is positive.  The latter condition holds if σ2 is 
sufficiently low and/or b is sufficiently high. So under these conditions, an increase in the 
voting weight of the viewers, whose vote is influenced relatively more by factors other 
than the singing effort of the contestants, could paradoxically lead to an increase in the 
aggregate singing effort in the contest. This means that α* = 1 could be optimal.  
To elaborate, note that (ln(b)/σ)2 – 1 > 0 and the second-order condition in (6a) 
imply  
( )21222 )/ln(/V242.0 θθ<σ<θ        (9) 
Also, 
2
121
*
1 )/)/(ln()/V39904.0ln(x σθθ−σθ=       (10) 
which is, of course, positive if 2121 )/)/(ln()/V39904.0ln( σθθ>σθ . Finally, we also 
require .0)/ln(xx 12
*
1
*
2 >θθ−=  
 9
 As an example, suppose V = 10, θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.8, and σ = 2. Then *1x = 2.4528 
and *2x = 0.3733. However, if σ increases from 2 to 2.02, each contestant’s effort 
increases such that *1x = 2.4535 and 
*
2x = 0.3740. Notice that the restriction in (9) is 
satisfied since, in both cases, 3.025= 0.242V/ θ2 < σ2 < [ln(8)]2 = (2.079)2. A plot of *1x , 
taking into account the restriction in (9), shows that aggregate effort is increasing in the 
interval σ∈[1.8, 2.078].9 Suppose then that 22 εσ and 22 ησ belong to the interval  
[1.8, 2.078] and σε > ση. Then 1.8 ≤ 2222 )1(2)(2 ηε σα−+σα=σ  ≤ 2.078 attains its 
highest value at α = 1. Therefore, only the viewers should vote, if the goal is to maximize 
aggregate efforts (i.e., α* = 1). But suppose that 22 ησ ∈  [1.8, 2.078) and  
22 εσ  > ln(8) = 2.079, then α = 1 is no longer optimal since the restriction in (9) is 
violated. Instead, it is optimal to have 0 < α* < 1 such that  
22 ησ < 078.2*)1(2*)(2 2222 ≤σα−+σα=σ ηε . 
                                                 
9 The actual interval is [1.8, 2.079). One may argue that a cost ratio of b = 8 between the contestants is too 
high and unrealistic in the real word. Such an argument takes models and the results thereof too literally. 
The main point is that the positive relationship between aggregate effort and the variance of the noise holds 
if the contestants are sufficiently different (i.e., if there are outstanding contestants). It is the intuition and 
economics behind this result, as discussed in the next section, that matter. If one were to literally put too 
much weight on the numbers, then one might as well question whether contestants in the real world are 
risk-neutral, have exponential cost functions, know how to differentiate functions, understand probability 
theory, maximize expected payoffs, etc.  Of course, macroeconomists who calibrate the “real world” and,  
to some extent, experimental economists who try to estimate parameters by fitting theoretical models to 
experimental data, worry about how realistic their numbers are (e.g., the degree of risk-aversion or the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution). The purpose of this paper is not to fit models to data. I am only 
interested in a simple comparative static question namely “what happens to aggregate effort in a contest 
when the level of noise is increased?” 
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The positive relationship between aggregate effort and the variance of the noise 
holds for 7.4 ≤ b ≤ 8 although the feasible interval for σ is smaller for smaller values of b. 
It does not hold for b < 7.4. 
The above analysis leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Consider a contest, such as American Idol, with expert judges and non-
expert judges (i.e., the viewers). If (i) the viewers’ voting behavior is noisier than that of 
the expert judges, (ii) the difference in the ability of the contestants is sufficiently high, 
and (iii) the variance of the noise, when the viewers have the entire voting power, is 
sufficiently low, then giving all the voting power to the viewers will lead to an increase in 
aggregate effort in the contest. On the other hand, if conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied 
but (iii) is violated, then it is optimal to give some voting power to both the expert judges 
and viewers. 10 
 
2.1 Discussion and relation to previous literature 
The intuition for the result in the preceding paragraph is based on a result in 
contests which is that the more level is the playing field in a contest, the higher is 
aggregate efforts. In the same vein, increasing the voting weight of the viewers 
introduces more noise into the contest and does not make success too sensitive to effort. 
This levels the playing field by giving low-ability contestants a reasonable chance of 
                                                 
10 In a different context, Myerson (1991) shows that a noisy communication channel can improve 
information transmission relative to a non-noisy communication channel. Blume, Board, and Kawamura 
(2007) extend the seminal contribution in Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of strategic information 
transmission by incorporating communication error (i.e, noise). An informed sender (i.e., an expert) sends a 
message to an uninformed receiver. With some probability, messages sent will not be received. Instead 
received messages are drawn from a fixed error distribution. Otherwise, messages go through as sent. 
Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007) show that this noisy communication channel is welfare-improving, if 
the noise is sufficiently small. Specifically, there is an equilibrium of the noise model that is Pareto superior 
to all equilibria of the Crawford-Sobel model. 
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success and thereby inducing them to boost their effort. By boosting their effort, they 
force the high-ability contestants to also boost their effort (i.e., *2
*
1 x/x ∂∂ > 0). It is 
important to note that this effect is a strategic effect. Knowing that the effort of a high-
ability contestant does not have a very strong impact on his success in the contest induces 
a low-ability contestant to exert more effort than he would otherwise. And this forces the 
high-ability contestant to react accordingly.  
To be sure, there are two opposing effects: a contestant has the incentive to slack 
if the contest becomes noisier. For want of a better term, I refer to this as the non-
strategic effect. However, the strategic effect described above may be strong enough to 
counteract this non-strategic effect. The ambiguity of the derivative in (8) is the result of 
these two opposing effects. This strategic effect exists when the contestants are non-
identical (i.e., b >1) and it is very strong if the difference in the abilities of the contestants 
is sufficiently high (i.e., b is sufficiently high). When the contestants are identical, then 
by definition, there cannot be a change in the contest that will level the playing  
field anymore than it already is.11  
On the preceding point, it is interesting to note that Sanjaya Malakar, realizing 
that he had a decent chance of being the winner or advancing to subsequent rounds (in 
American Idol) tried harder to improve upon his singing performance. Of course, the 
viewers do not vote entirely on popularity. A contestant’s singing performance also 
                                                 
11Based on the Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) framework, Mclaughlin (1988) found that increasing the 
variance of the noise in a tournament with identical contestants could lead to an increase in efforts. No 
intuition is given for this result and, unlike this paper, his result does not hinge on differences in the 
abilities of the contestants. Also, the production function in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) is of the form  
yk = ηxk + εk. It is the variance of the common noise variable η (not the variance of the idiosyncratic noise, 
εk) that accounts for this result. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) also found that an increase in the variance of 
the common noise could increase welfare. I am not aware of any paper in the literature on tournaments that 
argues that aggregate efforts will be higher as the tournament becomes noisier, if the contestants are 
sufficiently non-identical. 
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influences their votes. That was partly why Sanjaya Malakar was eventually voted out 
after he made it into the top seven contestants. To be sure, some noise in the contest is 
desirable but too much of it is clearly not desirable. This explains why the condition in  
(9) places upper and lower bounds on σ2. 
The intuition behind the above result also accounts for some results in literature 
on contests. For example, Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) apply this reasoning to a third-
party’s intervention decision in a conflict. In their model, helping a faction in the conflict, 
which takes the form of subsidizing his cost of effort, increases his valuation (i.e., the 
valuation effect). This will cause him to increase his effort. But this help also exerts an 
inequality effect by widening the “playing field” if the stronger faction is helped and 
narrowing it if the weaker faction is helped. Hence if the weaker faction is helped, the 
valuation effect and the inequality effect move in the same direction resulting in an 
increase in the aggregate cost of conflict. So the weaker faction should not be helped if 
the third-party’s goal is to reduce the aggregate cost of the conflict. On the other hand, 
helping the stronger faction widens the difference in the abilities of the contestants, so the 
inequality effect will result in a fall in aggregate effort. Of course, the increase in the 
valuation of the stronger faction will lead to an increase in his effort. Therefore, if the 
third-party wants to minimize the aggregate cost of the conflict, then he should help the 
stronger party if the inequality effect dominates the valuation effect.12 Otherwise, he 
should not help either faction.  
                                                 
12 The inequality effect and valuation effect are the analogues of the strategic and non-strategic effects 
discussed above. 
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Similarly, Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) found that excluding the most 
able contestant or a group of top contestants from a contest could result in an increase in 
aggregate expenditures. Of course, this occurs when the inequality effect of such  
exclusion dominates the valuation effect.13 Also, Che and Gale (1998) showed that a cap 
on bids could lead to an increase in aggregate expenditures because it levels the playing 
field making more difficult for high-ability contestants to pre-empt the efforts of low-
ability contestants.14 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) found that in a contest with an outstanding 
contestant, concentrating the entire prize into a grand single prize for first place may 
actually lower aggregate efforts, since the other contestants may not exert enough effort 
because they do not think that the have a decent chance of winning. Splitting the prize 
into a first prize and a second prize levels the playing field inducing low-ability 
contestants to exert greater effort which, in turn, forces the outstanding contestant to also 
increase his effort. Finally, Fu (2006) found that if a contest-designer handicaps a high-
ability contestant relative to a low-ability contestant, aggregate efforts increase. 
One may argue that placing some weight on popularity may cause the contestants 
to divert their efforts from singing into non-singing efforts in the competition. In this 
case, one requires a model where the contestants invest in both singing and non-singing 
                                                 
13 This also accounts for the result in Epstein and Nitzan (2006). 
14Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002) find that a cap on bids decreases aggregate expenditures, if the 
contestants have a linear cost of effort. This is in contrast to Che and Gale (1998). The difference stems 
from the fact that in Che and Gale (1998), the contestants are ex ante asymmetric and this is common 
knowledge. In Gavious et al. (2002), the contestants are ex ante symmetric but are asymmetric ex post 
(after independently and privately drawing their types from some continuous distribution). However, 
Gavious et. al (2002) find that a cap on bids increases aggregate expenditures if the cost of effort is a 
convex function and the number of contestants is sufficiently large. They find that bid caps lower the bids 
of high-valuation contestants but increase the bids of middle-valuation contestants. These opposing effects 
are akin to the valuation effect and inequality effect discussed above. 
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efforts. Such a contest will be similar to multi-activity contests as in Amegashie (2006), 
Konrad and Clark (2007), and Arbatskaya and Mialon (2007). To focus on the key 
driving force behind proposition 1, I do not consider this possible effect.  
Indeed, the diversion of efforts from singing to non-singing efforts is not borne 
out in reality. For example, contestants in American Idol focus their energies on 
improving their singing performance. They understand that they are in singing contest. 
The fact that viewers care about non-singing factors in addition to singing performance 
does not imply that the contestants will go out of their way to invest in non-singing 
activities. This will especially be the case if the contestants are uncertain about the 
viewers’ preferences over non-singing activities. Thus the model in this paper is 
applicable if the contestants are uncertain about the kind of non-singing factors that the 
viewers care about. These non-singing attributes could have several components 
including hairstyle, smile, sense of humor, tone of voice when speaking (as opposed to 
singing), choice of clothing, etc. Therefore, from the standpoint of the contestants, it is 
not unreasonable to simply treat the viewers’ preferences over non-singing activities, as 
noise. My argument is that viewers’ noisy preference for non-singing attributes (i.e., 
popularity) could paradoxically lead to an increase in aggregate singing efforts. 
I have assumed that increasing aggregate efforts is a desirable goal of a contest 
designer. This is a reasonable goal and has been used by several authors (e.g., Konrad 
and Gradstein, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001, 2006; and Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 
2007; Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). But the contest-designer may also care about the 
distribution of efforts as well. That is, viewers may care about competitive balance 
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(Szymanski, 2003). Viewers may prefer a more balanced contest to a lopsided contest 
even if aggregate effort in the former is lower. If we use the difference in efforts,  
*
1x  –
*
2x  = ln(b) as the measure of competitive balance then there is no change in 
competitive balance as the voting weight of the viewers is increased. 
Ideally, the contest designers prefer a contestant who is popular on the show and 
also has a high singing ability. But it appears that if they had to choose between the two, 
they would rather go for someone with a high singing ability and moderate popularity 
rather than someone with mediocre singing ability but with high popularity. This is 
because marketing and promotion agencies in the music industry can boost the popularity 
of a high-ability singer (after s/he has won the competition) through the choice of 
clothing, facial make up, appearances on talk shows, etc. It is much harder to improve the 
singing ability of a mediocre talent. And the popularity of a mediocre singing talent will  
eventually wane.15 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this short article, I have argued that while some may perceive the very 
successful Fox TV reality show, American Idol, as turning into a popularity contest 
instead of the singing contest it is supposed to be, this need not be a problem. On the 
                                                 
15 One past American Idol contestant with mediocre singing ability whose popularity hasn’t seemed to have 
waned is William Hung (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Hung). Although, he did not even make it 
past the audition stage, his popularity soared after his audition was shown on the program. However, in 
spite of his popularity, it must be noted that he has not won the kind of elite prizes in the music industry 
like the Grammy awards, multi-platinum selling albums, American Music Awards, Billboard Music 
Awards, etc.  So William Hung’s popularity, based on his non-singing abilities, has not won him the elite 
prizes in the music industry. In contrast, some of the past top four finalists like Carrie Underwood, Chris 
Daughtry, Clay Aiken, and Kelly Clarkson have won some of these elite prizes. Contestants like William 
Hung and Sanjaya Malakar, who are popular for reasons other than their singing ability, do not appear to be 
the type that the organizers of American Idol are interested in. 
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contrary, this could boost incentives by boosting aggregate efforts in singing. If viewers 
voted based solely on singing performance, low-ability contestants may not strive hard 
enough because their chances of winning the competition will be very small. This will, in 
turn, cause high-ability contestants to exert a lower effort than they otherwise would. By 
not making success in the contest too sensitive to effort, low-ability contestants are 
paradoxically induced to exert a higher singing effort. This, in turn, forces the high-
ability contestants to work harder and not be complacent. Hence, the current voting rule 
in American Idol under which only the votes of viewers count when the number of 
contestants is narrowed to twenty-four may be good for incentives. For the same reasons, 
giving some weight to the votes of viewers in Dancing with the Stars could also be good 
for incentives. 
There may yet be another reason why the current voting rule in American Idol 
may not have perverse effects. Since the votes of viewers only count after the set of 
contestants has been narrowed to twenty-four by the judges, it is likely that there will not 
be substantial differences in the abilities of the contestants. However, the judges 
sometimes get it wrong as the Sanjaya case showed. And to be sure, the judges are not 
totally certain of a contestant’s ability. Indeed, that is what the show is about: to discover 
talent. But doing so depends on giving the right incentives to elicit sufficient singing 
efforts from the contestants. Even a high-ability contestant may rest on her laurels or be 
complacent without the right incentives. Introducing sufficient noise into the contest by 
giving the viewers sufficient voting power may well be a desirable incentive mechanism. 
As noted in section 1, making the votes of viewers count may also be a necessary 
evil intended to make viewers feel a sense of participation and boost TV ratings of the 
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show. This article has shown that this participation motive may also have other desirable 
incentive effects.  
Finally, as argued in section 1, this paper makes a more general contribution to 
the design of contests, the allocation of voting rights in committees, and the desirability 
of low-powered incentive schemes. 
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